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what Dale Jamieson calls the "Argument from 
Innocence" against animal exploitation. 
Roughly, this argument contends that since 
animals are not criminals, we are not justi-
fied in inflicting suffering and death on 
them. It seems to me that this argument is 
not a serious one, for it is not directed 
against a justification for our exploiting 
animals which has or would ever be seriously 
put forward. To my knowledge, no one has 
ever claimed or even suggested that chickens, 
sheep, white mice, guinea pigs, etc., (ordi-
narily) are criminals and that our use of 
them in laboratories, abattoires, etc., is 
merely giving them the punishment they so 
richly deserve. "Those chickens are vicious 
little beasts, and de-beaking is just what 
they deserve" and "white mice are incorrigi-
ble little criminals who should be given 
cancer to Payoff their debt to society" are 
just not the sort of thing that anyone says 
to justify" factory farming or animal re-
search. Conse::IUently, nounting the Argument 
from Innocence seems but another example of 
tilting at windmills. 
Furthernore, in expanded form, the Argu-
ment from Innocence must read sanething like 
this: 
Pl: Prima facie, no sentient being 
should be exploited as a means merely 
for fulfilling the interests of others. 
(Let's call this "the right to re-
spect.") 
P2: The right to respect can be for-
feited, but it is forfeited only 
through committing serious crimes. 
P3: Animals have not cCllllllitted serious 
crimes. 
c: Therefore, animals have not for-
feited their right to respect. 
Whether Pl should read as it does or should, 
rather, be limited to a proposition referring 
only to htnnarl beings is what is at issue in 
the animal rights debate. Most mainstream 
noral philosophers (not to mention nost peo-
ple in general, if they ever made explicit 
their presumptions about such things) would 
insist that Pl is incorrect and should be 
replaced with sanething like the following: 
Pl' : Prima facie, no htnnarl being should 
be exploited as a means merely for ful-
filling the interests of others. 
It follows that the Argument from Innocence 
is circular, if it is supposed to be a con-
tribution to resolving the animal rights 
debate and may, conse::IUently, be disregarded 
when the issue concerns whether animals are 
entitled to rights. 
Nonetheless, the issue of animal inno-
cence--by which I ordinarily mean animals' 
supposed inability to recognize and respond 
to noral values--does seem to enter into the 
animal rights debate significantly in the 
following two ways. These two ways consti-
tute the horns of a dilenma on which it may 
be thought that animal rightists are skew-
ered: in order to answer the naturalistic 
objections to animal rights raised under the 
first heading, one can point to the innocence 
of animals, but that very innocence would 
seem to leave animal rights prey to the Kan-
tian criticism to be noted under the second 
heading. Let's call this "damned if they 
are, and damned if they're not" situation the 
"Dilenuna of Innocence." 
First, one of the nost ccmnon responses 
to animal liberation arguments is "But ani-
mals eat other animals!" '!his phrase seems 
to have a double meaning to those who use it: 
since animals conStnne other animals, 
they do not deserve to be treated any better 
by us, and 
since one species exploiting another is 
a standard, even essential, part of the na-
tural order, we are merely taking our place 
in nature and making our contribution to the 
natural cycle of life on earth when \'1e ex-
ploit animals. 
Questions of animal innocence are relevant to 
evaluating these contentions. We can call 
the first contention the "Let them reap what 
they sow!" defense of our exploiting animals, 
the second contention the "It's only natur-
al!" defense. We will deal briefly here with 
each in turn. 
Of course, it is :i.nmediately amusing 
when the "Let them reap what they sow1" de-
fense is offered in support of our consuming 
cattle, sheep, hogs, rabbits, and other her-
bivores. It is also striking that when ani-
mals occasionally turn the tables and prey on 
us, e.g., shark and bear attacks, we do not 
resignedly say "I guess we, too, have to reap 
what we sow." Rather, we usually brand suC"ll 
animals "renegades," "nonsters," or even 
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"murderers" and pursue them with unbridled 
vengeance. Apparently, we feel that if we do 
the reaping, that balances the books, but if 
we are the harvest, then retribution is 
needed to balance those books. I do not think 
that further discussion is needed to conclude 
that "Let them reap what they sow!" is just a 
self-serving excuse for our reaping the bene-
fits of being the strongest species around. 
Additionally, it can be noted that ani-
nal predation can usually be considered "in-
nocent," in that it is usually properly des-
cribed as "doing what they must in order to 
survive. " Animal predators cannot ordinarily 
be described as careless, callous, or self-
indulgent exploiters. So, if it is "only 
fair" for us to treat animals as they treat 
each other, then we should limit our exploi-
tation of them to "doing what we must in 
order to survive." Given our many frivolous 
uses of animals and the vast array of alter-
natives to aninal exploitation which we al-
ready have or could develop, our exploitation 
of aninals goes far beyond that limit. Con-
sequently, the "Let them reap what they sow!" 
justification of why it is rooral for us to 
exploit aninals is not only a hypocritical 
but also an insufficient excuse for the ex-
tent of our exploitation of them. 
Turning to the "It's only natural!" 
argument, this defense of our exploiting 
aninals presumes that we can learn how we 
roorally ought to behave by studying how ani-
mals behave. There probably is sane truth to 
this. Since we share ma"1¥ fhysical, psycho-
logical, and social needs with aninals, we 
may very well learn how efficiently to bal-
ance and fulfill these various needs through 
studying how aninals do this. Since at least 
one of the goals of roorality is camonly 
thought to be pranoting the general welfare 
through fulfilling, as far as possible, the 
needs of all, such knowledge can be of value 
in detennining what we roorally ought to do. 
However, if we presume that animals are 
innocent of roorality (and that nature is not 
structured and directed by a roorally con-
cerned super-natural being), it follows that 
there is no reason to believe that we will 
find in nature paradigms of rooral concern, 
rooral behavior, or rooral order. So, although 
studying the concerns, behavior, and social 
order of animals may provide useful inforna-
tion for developing answers to rooral ques-
tions, such study could not--contrary to what 
sane environmental ethicists seem to be-
lieve--reveal the fundamental rooral concerns 
or principles needed to answer rooral ques-
tions. For example, while what we ought 
roorally to do depends, in large part, on 
maximizing the general welfare and securing a 
fair shake for all, such goals can seem 
largely, if not completely, absent fran a 
natural order in which the survival and re-
production of the strongest appears to be the 
predominant organizing mechanism. Thus, if 
animals are innocent of roorality, we cannot, 
logically, point to the natural order in 
which one animal exploits another as a rooral 
paradigm justifying our exploiting animals. 
However, if animals are innocent of 
roorality, aninal rights would seem open to 
the following, Kantian criticism; since 
animals are not capable of being rooral a-
gents, they are not entitled to being consi-
dered as ends in themselves and, consequent-
ly, nay be exploited (humanely, of course) 
for the benefit of rooral agents (i.e., hunan 
beings). Here, curiously enough, being inno-
cent counts against aninals and aninal 
rights. 
cne can respond to this Kantian argument 
in several ways. For example, one can argue, 
as I have done elsewhere[2l, that animals are 
not as innocent of roorality as Kantians (and 
other mainstream rooral fhiloso};i1ers) 'NOuld 
have us believe. Contrary to what Kant nain-
tains, being rooral is not limited to acting 
out of respect for law, and contrary to what 
Huxley portrays, nature is not merely red in 
tooth and claw. Many rooral virtues, e.g., 
loyalty, canpassion, and self-sacrifice, are 
found in the animal realm. This resp:mse 
would, of course, raise doubts about what we 
have just said in response to the "It's only 
natural I "objection to animal rights. How-
ever, these doubts 'NOuld only complicate, not 
undermine, those answers. Briefly, to ac-
knowledge that aninals are not entirely inno-
cent of roorality no roore entails that their 
conm:>n patterns of interaction express basic 
rooral principles than does acknowledging that 
we are not entirely innocent of roorality 
entails that ccmron patterns of hunan inter-
action express basic rooral principles. "Is," 
even when it refers to the natural order, 
simply does not entail "ought, It fran which it 
does follow that sanething which is natural 
may, nonetheless, not be rooral[3l. 
Another response to the Kantian objec-
lion would not even raise such doubts; Kant 
has provided argument for why rooral agents 
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should (morally) be treated as ends in them-
selves, but he (nor anyone else, to my know-
ledge) has not derronstrated that only mo1.'al MDDHSPAH 
agents should (llOrally) be treated as ends in 
themselves. Furthenrore, since what, fran 
the Kantian perspective, is supposed to be 
unique about moral agents is our ability to 
act disinterestedly, impartially, fairly, 
etc., it hardly seems credible that possess-
ing this capacity can morally justify our 
pursuing our self-interest and exploiting 
animals. Ciling our ability to act out of a 
sense of justice as the justification for 
saying that we need not worry about justice 
\m.en it comes to our dealings with animals 
would seem to be a paradigm of a practical 
contradiction. Hence, even if animals are 
incapable of being moral agents, it is at 
least doubtful that this entitles us to ex-
ploit them. 
Thus, animals' innocence, i.e., their 
inability to be fully moral agents, can con-
tribute to answering the "But animals eat 
other animals! " objection to animal rights 
and can do so without leaving animal rights 
vulnerable to the Kantian side of the Dilerrma 
of Irmocence. That seems to me how it enters 
seriously into the animal rights debate. 
Notes 
1. we may also note that the suggestion 
in P2 that it is morally acceptable to treat 
criminals as mere means to society's satis-
factions would likely not be accepted by 
morally concerned people today. 
2. "Are Animals Moral Beings?," Ameri-
~ Philosophic! Quarterly 17 (1981). 
3. I discuss these "But animals eat 
other animals!" canplexities to animal rights 
at greater length in Chapter 6 of my forth-
coming Morals, Reason, and Animals. 
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Wolves 
Children of the mJQn 
Sired by the night wind 
(She tolerates him kindly 
as goddesses will 
who long for children) 
Wolves' 
Voices rising 
Echo their sire 
In rivalry of him 
They race across 
The rippling snows 
In speed and silence 
With Her silver 
still staining their fur 
Lunar gold 
Glows through their eyes 
Luna weeps for her children 
The night wind wails in grief 
Humankind: take heed 
For She 
Controls the tides 
And he commands the seas 
And their children are dying 
Paulette Callen 
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